Foreword: The top priority as we count down to the end of the talks with the Palestinians is to make absolutely sure that the Israeli 30 second attention span doesn't cause decision makers to accept an interim arrangement in which a sovereign Palestinian state is created inside
temporary boundaries. Sovereignty is a profoundly significant status and while this apparently escapes the average Israeli decision maker/policy advisor/journalist the same Palestinian leadership that actually went to the trouble to read each of the Oslo documents instead of the headlines of executive summaries will also invest the time and patience to map out a plan to exploit this sovereignty against the Jewish State. And of course one must never forget that the status of sovereignty, once granted, remains even in the event that the sovereign state renounces whatever terms, conditions and arrangements that were associated with it being granted sovereignty in the first place.
Nonetheless, with discussions focusing on the American security plan I want to share some thoughts on this matter as elements of the plan may be implemented even in the absence of a final agreement.
#1. Time element: As we witnessed in the case of Hong Kong, even very long term time-bound arrangements ultimately come to an end. If security depends on "arrangement X" what right do decision makers today have to strip Israelis in the future of this "arrangement X"? This sound even more reckless when one considers that a "long time" is being defined as a few years rather than a number of decades.
#2. Arbiters of performance: Under the American plan, Israeli security arrangements are to be pared down in accordance, in part, with the performance of the Palestinians on security matters. But who can reliably judge this performance?
Back in the early days of Oslo, US funding for the PA was contingent on a periodic assessment that the PA was in full compliance. So the US officials continuously lied – in writing – that the PA was in full compliance. If it serves US interests to say that the Palestinians are doing a great job on security matters then that is what the American reports will declare.
#3 A multitude of scenarios requiring Israeli security operations inside Palestinian territories: drop best case scenario assumptions and it doesn't require much thinking to come up with scores of scenarios in which protecting Israeli lives requires Israeli boots on the ground. And a reminder: it wasn't so long ago that the primary result of sharing intelligence with the PA about an impending terror attack threat was an intensive Palestinian search for Israel's intelligence source rather than the terror threat.
#4. The bizarre reference to Sinai as a positive example: Let's be clear about what happened in Sinai. Egypt under both Mubarak and Morsi declined to make any truly serious effort to stop the flood of weapons from Egyptian Sinai into the Gaza Strip. Over the years Israeli policy makers vacillated between openly complaining about Egypt to silence and even false praise. This while the American observer force in the Sinai had literally no impact on this farce.
#5. Billions for gizmos can't replace security presence: Even if Iron Dome was flawless much of the Israeli population lives too close to what would be Palestinian controlled areas to be under its cover. The efficacy of Iron Dome also hinges on the Palestinian rockets mostly landing in fields and thus not requiring interception.
